US Army General, John J. Pershing
This analysis, based on the methodology of All-source Intelligence of the Defense Intelligence Agency (day) and open sources (War Games, US Congress reports and reports from Think Tanks or ideas laboratories), seeks to offer an integral panorama of the possibilities of a conflict between the US and China by Taiwan, without pretending to predict its outcome with certainty. Given the growing Chinese power, the key will be in the effective deterrence and the joint preparation of the US, Taiwan and its allies to minimize the risks of a confrontation that, if occurred, would be extremely expensive for all the parties involved.
1. Summary of recent reports to Congress and War Games
1.1. Context of the report to Congress
• Increasing probability of an invasion: legislators of the House of Representatives were informed about the possible outcomes of a US-China conflict by Taiwan within one to two years. According to specialists, the Chinese defense industry operates “on a war foot” and has a naval construction capacity 230 times greater than that of the US, which increases the probability of an invasion to Taiwan.
• Projected dates: military analysts point out the year 2027 as the date on which China would be fully prepared to launch a large -scale military operation. However, simulation exercises have handled dates as close as 2026.
1.2. Findings of the Center Simulation for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS)
• Anfibia and allied response invasion: in 25 iterations of a Chinese amphibious invasion scenario, the coalition formed by the US, Taiwan and Japan managed to repel the attack and preserve the autonomy of the island. However, the casualties on all the sides were high.
Low and destruction of military team:
• USA lost between 10 and 20 warships, including 2 aircraft carriers, in addition to 200 to 400 combat planes; More than 3,000 American military died in the first three weeks.
• Taiwan was devastated and exhausted his critical ammunition.
• China lost up to 90% of its amphibious fleet, 52 surface ships and 160 combat planes.
1.3. Key lessons
China chooses the “Day D”: the time of the attack would be exclusively in the hands of Beijing, so Taiwan and its defenders must remain on a constant alert.
There is no “Ukraine model”: unlike the gradual supply of help to Ukraine, China’s geographical proximity and its sophisticated anti -mullet systems and anti -aircraft would force the US to intervene immediately to defend Taiwan.
The drone factor in the modern war
Although the war scenario in Taiwan modeling by the CSIS did not thoroughly included the use of drones, the war in Ukraine has demonstrated the effectiveness of these systems (both sea and aerial) as force multipliers.
Maritime drones: In Ukraine the destruction or significant damage of at least two dozen Russian ships in the Black Sea has been reported, forcing the Russian fleet to retreat from key coastal areas.
Air drones: It is estimated that Ukraine and Russia have used thousands of drones of different scope and autonomy, some of them capable of attacking strategic objectives hundreds of kilometers. The production of drones has shot, with manufacturing objectives that range from 1 to 4 million units per year in Ukrainian territory, and a similar rhythm by Russia.
Implications for Taiwan: rapid innovations in the use of drones (autonomy, artificial intelligence, modularity) suggest that directly extrapolate Taiwan’s scenarios could be dangerous, especially if differences in geography, industrial capacity and Tactics of both sides. Even so, the massive deployment of drones could significantly alter the dynamics of a hypothetical conflict.
2. Restrictions of the US defense industry
2.1. Insufficient industrial capacity
The report to Congress and simulations indicate that the US Industrial Defense Base would hardly replenish the losses of ships and war airplanes within a reasonable time, due to the limited production capacity.
In contrast, China could replace its casualties faster thanks to its enormous naval construction infrastructure and manufacture of military systems.
2.2. Shortage of ammunition
In a high-intensity scenario, the US and Taiwan would quickly exhaust critical ammunition, such as the Lrasm, Jassm-Er’s anti-missance missiles and the Taiwan systems themselves.
According to recent estimates, American anti -missance missile reserves (approx. 440 units) could be exhausted in less than seven days. In addition, Tomahawk Block V, Lrasm or Jassm missile production requires two years or more.
23. Labor factors and contractual agility
Shortage of specialized personnel: Missing engineers, technicians, high precision welders and other profiles necessary to increase military production in the short term.
“Peace time” mentality: current contracting and acquisition processes do not reflect the urgency of a possible large -scale conflict.
2.4. Critical supplies dependence
China exercises dominant control over the production of key components (rare earths, microelectronics, semiconductors), which could generate severe bottlenecks in the US defense industry.
3. Geopolitical and strategic considerations
3.1. Importance of Japan
According to the simulations, Japan would be the main ally for the US and Taiwan, providing bases and logistical support. Without its contest, the US force projection would be severely limited.
South Korea, meanwhile, has not authorized American combat missions since its territory and faces its own dilemma with North Korea.
3.2. Nuclear climb risks
Both US and China have nuclear weapons. A conventional conflict with high casualties could trigger internal pressures to climb to the nuclear, a scenario that seeks to avoid.
3.3. Possible third -party movements actors
Analysts point out that North Korea could take advantage of a US distraction in Taiwan to launch offensive actions against South Korea, especially now that Pyongyang maintains a growing military collaboration with Russia.
3.4. Taiwan defensive planning
Studies suggest investing in cheaper and difficult to destroy platforms (fast boats, submarines, coastal defenses), instead of large warships.
The priority of the Taiwanese forces would be “to maintain the line” to prevent China from establishing a solid beach head, since reverting a partial occupation is much more complex.
3.5. Political cost in China
• An eventual failure in Taiwan could politically destabilize the Beijing government, encouraging it to use more intensive military tactics not to lose internal legitimacy.
4. Would the US win?
4.1. A scenario of very high losses
Several exercises (CSIS, reports to Congress) indicate that the US, together with Taiwan and Japan, could stop a Chinese invasion, but at an extremely high cost. The destruction of aircraft carriers, fifth generation and surface ships, in addition to the loss of thousands of lives, would test the response capacity of the US industry.
4.2. The time factor
China, with its industrial base in “warfoot”, would choose the precise moment to launch the invasion, while the US and Taiwan would have to stay permanently alert.
A late response – for example, two weeks after the start of the offensive – would almost impossible to avoid the conquest of Taiwan.
4.3. “Victoria” in relative terms
Even if the US managed to “win” blocking Taiwan’s annexation, the economic, military and human cost would be so high that it could be considered a pyrrhic victory. Both powers, as well as the global economy, would suffer considerable damage.
4.4. Deterrence and preparation
To avoid this situation, Washington tries to strengthen alliances in Asia-Pacific, accumulate critical weapons reservations, accelerate the production of anti-man-and reduce the dependence on inputs controlled by China.
There is no progressive aid similar to that of Ukraine: assistance to Taiwan must be immediate and sustained to counteract the geographical proximity and naval power of China.
Key points of the Select Committee of the House of Representatives on the PCCH and the Defense Industry
China Naval Construction Capacity: 230 times greater than the US, placing it in a position to replace its losses more quickly.
Strategic objectives and mixed scenarios: as in the Russia-Ukraine war, a conflict in Taiwan could include simultaneous attacks against shipyards, airports and critical production centers to weaken the adversary logistics.
Insufficient ammunition reserves: Anti -man -and cruise missile stocks could be exhausted in a matter of days, seriously impacting Taiwan’s defense and the projection of US force.
Readjustment of spending priorities: USA and Taiwan must prioritize more agile and less expensive platforms instead of large vessels susceptible to attacks.
Coordination with Japan: immediate and deep. The US maintains defense agreements with Japan (including SOFA), facilitating the use of bases and armament cooperation.
Attention to other fronts: a conflict in Taiwan could encourage North Korea to launch parallel offensives against South Korea. It is speculated that Seoul could resort to defense plans such as the Operations Plan 5027 (OPLAN 5027) and even tactical atomic demolitions in the border area.
Nuclear threat: Avoid shares in Chinese continental territory, where aerial defenses are dense and nuclear climbing is more feasible.
Economic and industrial perspectives
• Taiwanese companies in Continental China: large high -tech companies, such as TSMC, operate factories in Chinese territory. In 2023, Continental and Hong Kong represented about 42% of Taiwan exports, while the US reached only 15%.
• Changes in production: South Korea, Japan and other Asian powers have begun to relocate their factories outside China, a trend that could accelerate if the risk of conflict increases.
• Medium -term impact: although China takes over factories in its territory, it could not easily trade with the Taiwanese brand or sustain the export of high added value without the collaboration of engineers and the international supply chain. In addition, Taiwan is establishing semiconductor plants in the US and other countries.
• Sanctions scenarios: an open aggression against Taiwan would lead to strong international economic sanctions similar to those imposed on Russia. The continuity of Chinese production and its access to global markets would be questioned, with deep effects on the internal stability and economic growth of Beijing.
Credits:
Lieutenant Colonel (retired) of the US Army, Mr. Octavio Pérez, and Mr. Artho Esopiñán contributed to this analysis. Mr. Octavio Pérez is the Senior Analyst of Military Affairs and Mr. Arthine In Miami that presides over and founded economist Dr. Rafael Marrero.
